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Progressive property theory emerged a decade ago to challenge law and economics as the
dominant theoretical mode of property law analysis. Offering a fresh look at the rights and
obligations of ownership, progressive property theory argues, among other propositions, that
property rules and institutions should further the ability of all people to obtain the basic
resources necessary to engage in the social and political life of a community.
Meanwhile, housing justice campaigns being waged across the United States, promoting
policies like inclusionary zoning and rent control, are frequently met by critics who make
theoretical arguments about the fundamental nature of property. Housing advocates often cede
the theoretical domain, and instead respond with pragmatic data-driven appeals or technical
precedential arguments that, I argue here, would benefit from a more robust theoretical
grounding of the sort progressive property theory could provide.
Progressive property theory, however, is yet to exert any measurable influence outside of
legal academia. Scholars have offered a variety of critiques of the theory that may help to
explain its limited impact. I argue that exogenous factors—those external to the theory
itself—also hold significant explanatory force. I conclude that the law school clinic could serve
as one “theory delivery mechanism” to infuse progressive property theory more broadly into
U.S. law and legal institutions.
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INTRODUCTION
In May of 2009, the Cornell Law Review published a short, two-page piece
entitled, A Statement of Progressive Property (the Statement).1 Authored by four
esteemed U.S. property law scholars—Gregory Alexander, Eduardo Peñalver,
Joseph Singer, and Laura Underkuffler—the Statement was intended to serve as the
foundation of a new theoretical mode of property law analysis. At the heart of the
Statement is the notion that our common conception of property—at core being
about the rights of owners to exclude and dictate the use of valued resources—pays
insufficient attention to the obligations of ownership.2 As such, our common
conception of property, while widely influential in U.S. law, is “inadequate as the
sole basis for resolving property conflicts or for designing property institutions.”3
The authors posit that we must look to the underlying values served by
property in order to develop a more robust theoretical framework. These values
include “life and human flourishing, the protection of physical security, the ability
to acquire knowledge and make choices, and the freedom to live one’s life on one’s
own terms. They also include wealth, happiness, and other aspects of individual and
social well-being.”4 Given the multivariate nature of such values, the authors argue
that they cannot be reduced to a single metric. The Statement was intended as a
response to law and economics as the dominant mode of theoretical analysis of
property law.5
Meanwhile, around the country advocates are engaged in campaigns to
improve the housing options for low-income households. These efforts are a
response to widespread and severe housing challenges related to affordability,
quality, security of tenure, as well as ongoing issues of residential racial segregation.
In recent years, some of the most prominent of these campaigns have advocated
for: the passage of inclusionary zoning ordinances,6 rent control or rent

1. Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph William Singer & Laura S. Underkuffler,
A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2009) [ hereinafter A Statement of
Progressive Property ].
2. Id.
3. Id. at 743.
4. Id.
5. Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL
L. REV. 745, 750 (2009) (making this point clear in a supplemental article published in the same issue
of the Cornell Law Review: “In recent years, law-and-economics analysis has dominated property
scholarship. One goal of this Article is to offer an alternative to that mode of analyzing property
disputes. Although law-and-economics theory certainly provides important insights into a remarkably
wide range of property issues, its vision is limited and at times flawed. Perhaps the greatest flaw in lawand-economics theory is the poverty of its analysis of moral values and moral issues.”).
6. See infra Section II.A. for analysis of recent inclusionary zoning litigation at the U.S. Supreme
Court level.
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stabilization,7 prohibiting discrimination against Section 8 voucher holders,8 rental
housing quality inspection programs,9 and an expansion of federal rental
assistance.10
These campaigns are regularly met with fierce opposition from critics who
often appeal to arguments about the fundamental nature of property. For example,
inclusionary zoning ordinances typically require developers of new rental or for-sale
multifamily properties to set aside a certain percentage of units (frequently five to
twenty percent) for occupancy by lower-income households.11 Opponents claim
that such ordinances deprive owners of fundamental property rights and thus
constitute an uncompensated taking of private property in violation of the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.12 Similar arguments are made with respect to
rent control and related housing campaigns.13
As a theory that takes the contours of property rights as its main concern,
progressive property theory has something important to contribute to such debates.
Yet notwithstanding the theoretical force that it could bring to bear, ten years since
the publication of its original manifesto, the theory is yet to have any demonstrable
impact beyond legal academia. Scholars have commented on its progress and
offered a variety of theoretical critiques assessing its feasibility,14 adversarial

7. See infra Section II.B. for a discussion of the recent Proposition 10 rent control campaign in
California.
8. See POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL, EXPANDING CHOICE: PRACTICAL
STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING A SUCCESSFUL HOUSING MOBILITY PROGRAM app. B (2018) [hereinafter
PRRAC, SECTION 8 DISCRIMINATION] (documenting the increasing number of state and local laws
barring so-called “source-of-income” discrimination); see also AM. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION 119A RE
SOURCE OF INCOME DISCRIMINATION (2017) (urging federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial
governments to prohibit housing discrimination on the basis of lawful source of income).
9. See, e.g., Bill Turque, ‘Healthy Homes’ Measure for Inspecting Rental Properties in Kansas City
Passes, K.C. STAR (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/election/
article216232395.html [ https://perma.cc/PNS3-XVBA ] (noting dozens of other such programs).
10. See, e.g., DOUGLAS RICE, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, CONGRESS SHOULD
INCREASE HUD FUNDING IN 2019 TO PREVENT VOUCHER CUTS, HELP CHILDREN ESCAPE
POVERTY (2018).
11. See EMILY THADEN & RUONIU WANG, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POLICY, INCLUSIONARY
HOUSING IN THE UNITED STATES: PREVALENCE, IMPACT, AND PRACTICES 46 (2017) [hereinafter
INCLUSIONARY HOUSING IN THE U.S.].
12. See infra Section II.A.
13. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) (upholding San Jose’s rent control
ordinance in the face of a landlord’s challenge on takings grounds).
14. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959 (2009); see infra Section III.A. for a discussion of
Smith’s critique.

First to Printer_Weiss (Do Not Delete)

2019]

PROGRESSIVE PROPERTY THEORY

10/29/2019 1:37 PM

255

approach to challenging law and economics,15 and failure to adequately address
issues of initial acquisition and distribution as they relate to race.16
While such constructive critiques are productive, I argue that progressive
property theory’s failure to have a broader impact cannot be explained solely by
reference to weaknesses in its theoretical constructs—though surely plenty in the
Statement and associated scholarship could be debated at length. Rather than being
a story of law and economics simply emerging victorious from the neutral
battlefield of ideas, I argue that exogenous factors—i.e., factors unrelated to the
content of the theory itself—have played a significant role that, thus far, have not
been adequately considered in the progressive property scholarship. In making this
argument, I draw upon Jon Hanson’s analysis of the rise of law and economics and
the wide array of stakeholders that supported its ascension.17
Needless to say, progressive property theory has been supported by no similar
effort to alter the property law landscape. Housing justice campaigns proceed with
advocates regularly ceding the theoretical domain, and instead making pragmatic
data-driven appeals or technical precedential arguments that lack a more coherent
theoretical basis. In this Article, I argue that progressive property theory could
provide such a theoretical grounding. In order to do so, however, and to more
broadly influence the institution of American property law writ large, it needs to be
the province of more than a select group of legal scholars. Specifically, it needs to
connect with vehicles of mobilization that can infuse the theory into real world legal
debates. I conclude by offering the law school clinic as one such promising vehicle.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II reviews the basic principles of
progressive property theory in contrast to law and economics. Part III examines
recent housing justice campaigns and offers inclusionary zoning and rent control as
examples to demonstrate how progressive property theory could provide helpful
theoretical grounding. Part IV considers critiques of progressive property theory
and argues that external factors are essential to a complete understanding of the
relative dominance of law and economics. Part V offers the law school clinic as one
potential vehicle for furthering the impact of progressive property theory,
particularly in housing justice campaigns.

15. See, e.g., Jedediah Purdy, A Few Questions About the Social-Obligation Norm, 94 CORNELL
L. REV. 949 (2009); Katrina M. Wyman, Should Property Scholars Embrace Virtue Ethics—A Skeptical
Comment, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 991 (2009); see infra Section III.A. for a discussion of Purdy’s and
Wyman’s critiques.
16. See Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 CAL
L. REV. 107 (2013); infra Section III.A. for a discussion of Rosser’s critique.
17. See, e.g., Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 PENN. L. REV. 129 (2003)
[hereinafter The Situation].
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I. PROGRESSIVE PROPERTY THEORY AS A RESPONSE TO LAW & ECONOMICS
A. Against a Background of Law & Economics
Progressive property theory emerged in 2009 in response to law and
economics as the dominant theoretical mode of property law analysis.18 Law and
economics has both positive and normative dimensions. The positive dimension
aims to use the tools of economic analysis to describe how the law operates and
what the consequences will be of various legal regimes. The normative dimension
argues for what the law and its ends should be.
Progressive property theorists acknowledge that law and economics comes in
many variations.19 At the core of most formulations is a commitment to some form
of utilitarian moral theory. Such theories aim to maximize utility, a term defined in
various ways. Early law and economics theorists used wealth as an easy and
measurable stand-in for utility. More recently, law and economics scholars have
used the concept of “welfare” to more broadly cover all individual desires and
preferences.20
Under a standard law and economics approach, the goal of law is to maximize
utility. Legal rules are efficient to the extent that they maximize, depending on the
version of utility being employed, net wealth or welfare. The positive dimension of
law and economics thus aims to explain which legal rules are most efficient, and the
normative dimension argues that we should embrace the legal rules that maximize
efficiency.
Law and economics has often been used to justify strong private property
rights on efficiency grounds. The basic argument, such as the one contained in a
famous formulation by Harold Demsetz, is that public property leads to inefficient
behavior, such as overconsumption and freeriding.21 Private property encourages
owners to internalize the consequences of their decisions, thus reducing such
inefficient behavior and increasing utility.
Critics of law and economics argue that it fails to take sufficient account of
distributional outcomes. Law and economics scholars often take as a point of
departure the Coase Theorem, or the proposition that in the absence of transaction
costs, efficient outcomes will be attained regardless of how original property

18. For
general
background
on
law
and
economics,
see
RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (9th ed. 2014); GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO
M. PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY 11–33 (2012).
19. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 5, at n.6 (“I will be contrasting my social-obligation approach
with a full family of approaches adopted by various legal scholars plying the “law-and-economics”
tradition. Thus, I take into account the fact that law and economics has splintered into sundry variants
since the 1970s, when Judge Richard Posner first promoted “wealth-maximization” as the solely
relevant value (though he later turned away from that position).”).
20. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto
Principle, Preferences, and Distributive Justice, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 331 (2003).
21. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967).
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entitlements are assigned. In other words, parties will bargain to the efficient
outcome regardless of whether a property entitlement is granted to Party A or Party
B, barring obstacles to negotiation. As such, in the absence of transaction costs,
economic efficiency is indifferent to how property entitlements are distributed.
Where transaction costs are present, economic efficiency argues for those
entitlements that encourage the most knowledgeable choices between social
benefits and social costs—such as allocating entitlements such that costs are placed
on the party that is best suited to engage in the appropriate cost-benefit analysis or,
in certain contexts, the cheapest cost-avoider.22
To the extent that distributional outcomes are a concern, law and economics
scholars classically argue that it is inefficient to alter legal rules in order to yield an
alternative distribution of property entitlements. Rather, it is more efficient to allow
the market to operate so as to maximize net utility and instead use the tax and
transfer system to adjust distributional outcomes.23 And since that method is most
efficient, the normative dimension of law and economics argues that it should be
the favored approach.
B. The Emergence of Progressive Property Theory
In 2009, in a gesture that remotely conjures up the image of Martin Luther
and his ninety-five theses, Gregory Alexander, Eduardo Peñalver, Joseph Singer,
and Laura Underkuffler published the Statement. In a format atypical for law review
articles, the Statement consists of only two pages and sets forth five principles in list
format (some with sub-principles), which push back against many of the
characteristics and assumptions inherent in classic law and economics scholarship.
The Statement was intended to trace the broad outlines of an alternative
theoretical approach to resolving property conflicts and designing property
institutions. At the heart of the Statement is the notion that the common conception
of property—at core being about the rights of owners to exclude and dictate the
use of valued resources—is insufficient because of “the inevitable impacts of one
person’s property rights on others.”24 The authors argue that in order to devise a
better property system, it is necessary to examine the values served by property,
including “life and human flourishing, the protection of physical security, the ability
to acquire knowledge and make choices, . . . wealth, happiness, and other aspects of
individual and social well-being.”25
Alexander expands on this notion in a companion article, in which he grounds
progressive property theory not in the utilitarian tradition of Jeremy Bentham and

22. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
23. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).
24. A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 1, at 743.
25. Id.
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John Stuart Mill, but rather in the tradition of Aristotelian ethics that takes human
flourishing as an “objective human good.”26 In this and other writing, Alexander
draws upon the “capabilities approach” of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum,
which posits that human flourishing is contingent upon the nurturing of certain
capabilities: among those Alexander emphasizes are life (including health and
security), freedom (including identity and self-knowledge), practical reason
(consisting of the ability to deliberate about what is good for oneself), and
“sociality” or “affiliation.”27 Alexander and Peñalver argue that such capabilities are
not developed in a vacuum but rather only emerge in community.28 As such, they
argue for an obligation to foster the development of these capabilities in others.29 In
doing so, they draw upon Thomas Aquiñas, who built on Aristotelian ethics and
argued for a duty “to support the social and material preconditions for [others’]
(and our own) flourishing.”30
Not surprisingly given these theoretical roots, distributional concerns are at
the core of the Statement: “Property confers power. It allocates scarce resources that
are necessary for human life, development, and dignity. Because of the equal value
of each human being, property laws should promote the ability of each person to
obtain the material resources necessary for full social and political participation.”31
Law is not coterminous with morality in Alexander and Peñalver’s view; it is
not the province of the law to enforce all worthy moral claims.32 The legal system

26. See Alexander, supra note 5, at 767. Alexander defines human flourishing as “enabl[ing]
individuals to live lives worthy of human dignity.” Id. at 748.
27. Id. at 765; see also ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 18, at 90 (defining “sociality” as “a
capability that encompasses subsidiary capabilities such as the possibility of social participation, selfrespect and friendship”).
28. See Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of Community,
10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 127, 135 (2009) (“[H]uman beings develop the capacities necessary for a
well-lived, and distinctly human life only in society with, indeed, dependent upon, other human beings.
To put the point even more directly, living within a particular sort of society, a particular web of social
relationships, is a necessary condition for humans to develop the distinctively human capacities that
allow us to flourish.”); see also Alexander, supra note 5, at 761 (“Language itself—possibly even the
capacity to so much as think—is an artifact of community. Community is constitutive of human
flourishing in a very deep sense; perhaps community even comprises humanity (as that term is used by
many understandings.”).
29. See ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 18, at 91 (“If we can agree that our physical
survival, our capacities to engage in practical reasoning, to participate in the social life of the community,
and to make decisions about how to live our lives, are valuable components of the well-lived human
life, then it would seem that we should also be able to agree that we owe some obligation to others
within our communities to share our resources to support and nurture the social structures necessary
for the development of these human capabilities. For if we affirm the value of these goods, and if these
goods can only exist within particular sorts of social contexts and physical environments, then it would
seem irrational to deny that we are obligated to participate in and contribute to the vitality of those
social structures and physical environments. The facts of social dependence and interdependence
prevent us from drawing clear lines between our individual well-being, or flourishing, and that of
others.”).
30. Id. at 85.
31. A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 1, at 744.
32. See ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 18, at 92.
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can and should, in their view, help promote human flourishing by enforcing certain
moral obligations, including the duty to share surplus resources with those for
whom a lack thereof is an obstacle to developing the capabilities necessary to
flourish.33 They argue that in modern times “the voluntary actions of private entities
have never been sufficient to supply all members of society with access to all of the
resources necessary for the opportunity to develop the capabilities necessary for
human flourishing.”34 At a minimum these resources include obtaining basic
“survival resources,” “minimal provision for the well-being and education of the
young,” “the economic resources necessary to provide a suitable environment in
which the education effort can take root,” and the resources “necessary in order to
facilitate the capability of sociality.”35
In addition to ensuring these basic survival resources, the authors of the
Statement also emphasize law’s role in shaping the communal aspects of life.36
“Property enables and shapes community life. Property law can render relationships
within communities either exploitative and humiliating or liberating and ennobling.
Property law should establish the framework for a kind of social life appropriate to
a free and democratic society.”37
The existence of the objective moral good of flourishing and the duty to
support the flourishing of others means that normative claims about what a
property law system should promote require more than a mere utilitarian measuring
of individual desires and preferences. “Values can generate moral demands and
obligations that underlie judgments about the interests that the law should recognize
as property entitlements.”38 In other words, an analysis of values relevant to
flourishing may argue for a set of property rules and institutions that deviates from
what a simple tallying of aggregate preferences and desires would dictate. A legal
system, such as that encouraged by law and economics, aimed at maximizing net
utility as measured by satisfaction of individual preferences and desires, may not
best promote human flourishing and thus may be left morally wanting.
The authors of the Statement also take issue with the notion that tallying along
a single scalar metric is appropriate given the multivariate and incommensurable
nature of the underlying human values at stake in the fashioning of property law

33. While not grounded in any expectation of direct reciprocity, Alexander and Peñalver argue
that a second-order notion of reciprocity supports this duty: “This second order reciprocity does not
operate through a long run accounting of costs and benefits, but rather looks to the possibility of rough
reciprocity built into the structure of our social relationships.” Id. at 92.
34. Id. at 95.
35. Id. at 96.
36. Here and elsewhere, earlier incarnations of the themes developed in the Statement can be
found in prior writings. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property,
40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 653 (“If we see people as situated in relation to others, rather than as isolated
and autonomous, our understanding of social life changes, and with it, our understanding of the source
of legal obligations.”).
37. A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 1, at 744.
38. Id. at 743.
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rules. “The plural values implicated by property are incommensurable. Because they
relate to qualitatively distinct aspects of human experience, they cannot be
adequately understood or analyzed through a single metric. Reducing such values
as health, friendship, human dignity, and environmental integrity to one common
currency distorts their intrinsic worth.”39 How does one weigh the relative utility of
one quantum of health-preference against one quantum of liberty-preference in
conducting a welfarist analysis? The collapsing of all human values into a single
scalar metric of “welfare” may be convenient for theoretical purposes, but if it
results in a failure to capture the complexity and different-ness of the values at stake,
then what is left is a tidy but inaccurate theory.40
If not a matter of tallying individual preferences and desires, then what would
a progressive property-infused analysis look like? Here the authors of the Statement
are upfront about the fact that its output would be necessarily messy. Their
prescription is to proceed with rational deliberation in the face of this complexity.
“Choices about property entitlements are unavoidable, and, despite the
incommensurability of values, rational choice remains possible through reasoned
deliberation. That deliberation should include non-deductive, non-algorithmic
reflection.”41 According to David Wiggins, as cited by Alexander and Peñalver, the
best we can do in the face of incommensurability is “attend to each value in its
separateness and irreducibility to others.”42 Perhaps we are not always left with a
single correct choice, but we are at least left with a more honest and robust method
of analysis.43
A commitment to human flourishing as an objective human good and a duty
to consider the flourishing of others as a basic obligation; a direct concern with
distributional outcomes and the role that law plays in fashioning communal life; and
a rebuke of preference-tallying along a single scalar metric as a feasible approach to
generating moral claims about what a property law system should aim to do: these
are some of the key notions expressed by the authors of the Statement in their
attempt to depart from law and economics and fashion a new theoretical approach
to property law.

39. Id. at 744.
40. See ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 18, at 98 (“But the question just is whether such
a single scale exists, and pluralists deny that it does. Accordingly, the fact that value monists can generate
a simpler decision-making process does not constitute an argument on behalf of those theories unless
it is in fact true that there is such a single, all-encompassing value. If values are in fact plural and
incommensurable, the difficulty of making social choices is simply a challenge that must be faced.”).
41. A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 1, at 744.
42. See ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 18, at 100 (citing David Wiggins,
Incommensurability: Four Proposals, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL
REASON 52, 62 (Ruth Chang ed., 1998)).
43. See ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 18, at 101.
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II. HOUSING JUSTICE CAMPAIGNS
Meanwhile, ten years ago, as the authors of the Statement labored away on their
progressive property principles, housing advocates, tenants, organizers, and legal
aid attorneys engaged in a variety of different, though not so unrelated, labors. The
Great Recession was forcing a rapidly escalating number of households out of the
workforce.44 And yet, the best the government had to offer the great majority of
those households unable to keep up on rent was to place their names on waitlists
behind thousands of households already in line—a function of the fact that housing
assistance is not an entitlement for low-income households in the United States.45
As other households lost their homes in the subprime mortgage foreclosure
crisis, they were forced back into the rental market, contributing to a rapid escalation
of market rents over the next several years.46 This combined with a number of other
factors, including ongoing stagnation of wages, to result in households paying an
increasing portion of their income on rent and cutting back on other basic
necessities.47 At the same time, the high prevalence of evictions emerged into the
national consciousness.48
For those lucky enough to find affordable housing, substandard conditions
remained an issue, most acutely for those households with young children.49 And
while some cities made progress, residential racial and economic segregation
continued to be pervasive, with all the attendant impacts on life outcomes that have
come to be understood.50

44. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S
HOUSING 28, 31 (2010) (“The nation lost approximately 8.4 million jobs from the beginning of the
recession in December 2007 through December 2009 . . . . It will likely take years for the fallout from
the Great Recession to abate.”).
45. See, e.g., Aaron Schrank, It’s a Long Wait for Section 8 Housing in U.S. Cities, MARKETPLACE
(Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.marketplace.org/2018/01/03/wealth-poverty/its-long-wait-section-8housing-us-cities [ https://perma.cc/2FTK-NKBB ] (providing Los Angeles as an example where
188,000 people recently applied for 20,000 spots on the Section 8 Voucher waitlist, a list from which
approximately only 200 names are drawn per month).
46. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S
HOUSING 4 (2016) (“On the renter side, the number of cost-burdened households rose by 3.6 million
from 2008 to 2014, to 21.3 million. Even more troubling, the number with severe burdens (paying more
than 50 percent of income for housing) jumped by 2.1 million to a record 11.4 million.”).
47. Id.
48. This phenomenon was driven in part by Matthew Desmond’s 2016 Pulitzer Prize-winning
book, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY.
49. See Michael Weitzman, Ahmareen Baten, David G. Rosenthal, Risa Hoshino, Ellen Tohn
& David E. Jacobs, Housing and Child Health, 43 CURRENT PROBS. PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT
HEALTH CARE 187 (2013) [hereinafter Housing and Child Health].
50. See generally Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren & Lawrence F. Katz, The Effects of Exposure to
Better Neighborhoods on Children: New Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment, 106
AM. ECON. REV. 855 (2016); KEVIN FOX GOTHAM, RACE, REAL ESTATE, AND UNEVEN
DEVELOPMENT: THE KANSAS CITY EXPERIENCE, 1900–2010 (2d ed. 2014) [hereinafter RACE, REAL
ESTATE, AND UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT]; RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A
FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017) [hereinafter
THE COLOR OF LAW].
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A variety of campaigns emerged in response: to improve tenant living
conditions, to provide more federal assistance, to prevent displacement and rapidly
soaring rents, and to expand supply in “communities of opportunity.” In each case,
critics met these efforts with a variety of familiar arguments: commonly, that (1) a
given campaign or policy is not the best means to achieve the purported end,51 (2)
even worse, a given campaign or policy will hurt those it is intended to help,52 and
(3) even if a given policy or campaign would achieve its purported end, it
unconstitutionally or otherwise improperly would infringe on private property
rights.53
For purposes of this Article, I am primarily concerned with the last of these
types of argument.54 Below, I describe how such arguments about the infringement
of private property rights have manifested in the context of inclusionary zoning
litigation at the U.S. Supreme Court level, in the context of a political initiative like
rent control, and how they are relevant to a broader spectrum of housing justice
campaigns. Such arguments are necessarily built upon a basic conception of the
nature of property rights. As such, I also describe in each case how progressive
property theory, which takes the contours of property rights and obligations as its
primary subject, could be deployed to address such arguments.

51. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, The False Promise of the Mixed-Income Housing Project, 57
UCLA L. REV. 983, 1019 (2010) (“[B]uilding mixed-income subsidized projects is a mediocre policy
approach. In most contexts, using tax revenues to enhance spending on housing vouchers would be far
more efficient and fairer than devoting those same revenues to providing inclusionary units.”).
52. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, Land Use Regulations and Good Intentions, 33 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 87, 142 (2017) (“A classic example of good intentions producing bad results is the tendency
of regulations promulgated to provide better housing instead resulting in less housing and less
affordability.”); see also Brief of Scholars of Land Use Regulation as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
616 Croft Ave., LLC, v. City of West Hollywood, 136 S. Ct. 377 (2017) (No. 16-1137) [hereinafter Land
Use Scholars Brief] (“[B]oth economic theory and empirical evidence indicate that like exclusionary
zoning, inclusionary zoning tends to reduce the supply of housing and increases prices relative to what
we would see without it.”).
53. See infra Section II.A. for a discussion of this sort of argument in the context of inclusionary
zoning.
54. Debates and studies regarding the efficacy of policies aimed at increasing housing
affordability have been had at length, and will continue, elsewhere. See, e.g., Peter Marcuse & W. Dennis
Keating, The Permanent Housing Crisis: The Failures of Conservatism and the Limitations of Liberalism,
in A RIGHT TO HOUSING: FOUNDATION FOR A NEW SOCIAL AGENDA (Rachel G. Bratt, Michael E.
Stone & Chester Hartman eds., 2006); AMY ARMSTRONG, VICKI BEEN, RACHEL MELTZER & JENNY
SCHUETZ, NYU FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN POLICY, THE EFFECTS OF
INCLUSIONARY ZONING ON LOCAL HOUSING MARKETS: LESSONS FROM THE SAN FRANCISCO,
WASHINGTON DC AND SUBURBAN BOSTON AREAS (2008); William C. Apgar, Jr., Which Housing
Policy Is Best?, 1 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 1 (1990). The purpose of this Article is not to engage in
these important debates, but rather to examine a different breed of argument—namely, that a given
policy would impermissibly intrude upon basic property rights.
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A. INCLUSIONARY ZONING—PROPERTY THEORY IN THE CONTEXT OF
U.S. SUPREME COURT LITIGATION
The Lincoln Institute of Land Policy reports that 886 jurisdictions in the
United States across twenty-five states and the District of Columbia have adopted
inclusionary housing policies.55 The most prominent of such policies is inclusionary
zoning, an approach that dates back to the 1970s.56 A typical inclusionary zoning
ordinance requires the developer of a new multifamily residential project to set aside
a certain percentage of units—frequently in the range of five to twenty percent—
for occupancy by low- or moderate-income households.57 The ordinance often
requires the recordation of a document on title setting forth rent or sales price limits
on the set-aside units. To help offset the cost, jurisdictions frequently offer
developers various options from a menu of incentives, including density bonuses,
expedited permitting, fee reductions and/or waivers, zoning variances, and various
tax benefits.58 Developers also are often given the option of paying a fee in lieu of
providing the affordable units equal to the cost of providing similar units off site.59
The efficacy of inclusionary zoning has been vigorously debated. Supporters
point to the number of rent-restricted units created,60 while critics claim that such
policies merely increase rents for everyone else in the area.61 For purposes of this
Article, I am concerned with another frequent criticism of inclusionary zoning
laws: namely, that they impermissibly infringe on private property rights.
1. 616 Croft Ave., LLC v. City of West Hollywood
This argument figured prominently in the recent 616 Croft Ave., LLC v. City
of West Hollywood case.62 At issue was the City of West Hollywood’s inclusionary
zoning ordinance that contained a typical set-aside requirement, requiring
developers to restrict twenty percent of newly-constructed units to certain
below-market levels. Developers alternatively could pay an in-lieu fee into the city’s
affordable housing trust fund to be used to develop subsidized housing off site. The
developer-plaintiff in the case had applied to the city for the permits necessary to
develop an eleven-unit condominium building. The city conditioned its approval of
the project on the payment of a $540,393.28 in-lieu fee. The developer sued,
claiming that the conditional approval amounted to an unconstitutional taking of

55. INCLUSIONARY HOUSING IN THE U.S., supra note 11, at 11.
56. Id. at 36.
57. Id. at 46.
58. Id. at 38–39.
59. Id. at 42.
60. Id. at 2 (noting that inclusionary housing policies like inclusionary zoning with the option
of paying an in-lieu fee have created 49,287 affordable homeownership units in 443 jurisdictions and
122,320 affordable rental units in 581 jurisdictions).
61. See, e.g., Land Use Scholars Brief, supra note 52.
62. 3 Cal. App. 5th 621 (2016), petition for cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017) (No. 16-1137).
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property without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution.
The City of West Hollywood had prevailed in the case at the state appellate
level and the plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Six amicus briefs were
filed in support of the developer by various organizations and individuals, including:
(1) the Southeastern Legal Foundation; (2) the Cato Institute, the Reason
Foundation, and the National Association of Home Builders; (3) the National
Federation of Independent Business, Small Business Legal Center, and Owners’
Counsel of America; (4) the Citizens’ Alliance for Property Rights Legal Fund;
(5) the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence; and (6) Scholars of Land Use
Regulation.
The petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court by the developer
offered a strong rendering of the fundamental nature of private property rights:
“[T]he right of the owner of property to fix the price at which he will sell
it is an inherent attribute of the property itself, and as such is within the
protection of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. . . .”63 An owner of
property has a “clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he pleases
and at such price as he can obtain.”64
The amicus briefs in support of the petition also offered similar renderings of
the nature of property rights. The Southeastern Legal Foundation’s brief, for
example, stated:
In fact, property well may be considered the foundation for the other civil
rights that we enjoy. John Locke, whose writings influenced the leaders of
the American Revolution and the Framers of the Constitution more than
any other single philosopher, described the preservation of property as
“the end of government, and that for which men enter into society. . . .”
Locke’s view found its way into both the English common law and the
Enlightenment that generated our government. Private property and a free
society were “so intimately connected as to be all but equivalent. . . .”
This Court has recognized the interplay between property rights and other
civil rights. “The right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no
less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth, a ‘personal’
right, whether the ‘property’ in question be a welfare check, a home, or a
savings account. In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the
personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could
have meaning without the other. . . .”

63. 616 Croft Ave., LLC v. City of West Hollywood, 3 Cal. App. 5th 621 (2016), petition for
cert. filed, 2017 WL 1090008, at *17 (U.S. Mar. 15, 2017) (No. 16-1137) (citing Old Dearborn
Distrib. Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 191–92 (1936)).
64. 616 Croft Ave., LLC v. City of West Hollywood, 3 Cal. App. 5th 621 (2016), petition for
cert. filed, 2017 WL 1090008, at *17 (U.S. Mar. 15, 2017) (No. 16-1137) (citing Ex parte Quarg,
149 Cal. 79, 80 (1906)).
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Like other civil rights, property rights include the authority to dominion
and use as one sees fit.65
The brief for the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence contained a similar
construction of the nature of property rights:
One of the core principles of the American Founding is that individual
rights are not granted by majorities or governments, but are
inalienable. . . . The Fifth Amendment seeks to capture a part of this
principle in its announcement that “private property [shall not] be taken
for public use, without just compensation. . . .” The importance of the
individual right in property that is protected in this clause is evident in the
writings on which the Founders based the notion of liberty that is
enshrined in the Constitution.66
By contrast, not a single amicus brief was filed with the Supreme Court in
support of the city. No counter conception of the fundamental nature of property
was presented. The city’s opposition brief focused on technical arguments about
the inapplicability of the Court’s Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz decisions to generally
applicable land use regulations.67 Nowhere did the brief contain an alternative
conception of the contours and limits of property rights. The phrase “property
rights” does not appear once in the opposition brief. While in this case, the Court
ultimately denied certiorari, the decision was not made on the basis of any robust
competing version of private property rights.
2. California Building Industry Ass’n v. City of San Jose
Questions about the fundamental nature of property rights also arose in
California Building Industry Ass’n v. City of San Jose, another recent inclusionary
zoning case.68 The City of San Jose adopted an ordinance in January 2010 that,
subject to various exemptions, required fifteen percent of units in new for-sale
residential developments to be affordable to buyers with extremely-low to
moderately-low incomes, or else for the developer to pay an in-lieu fee, dedicate
land, or build off-site affordable housing. The ordinance was passed in an effort to
address the fact that nearly half of all households in San Jose pay more than thirty

65. Brief for Southeastern Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
16–17, 616 Croft Ave., LLC v. City of West Hollywood, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017) (No. 16-1137) (internal
citations omitted).
66. Brief for Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners
at 13, 616 Croft Ave., LLC v. City of West Hollywood, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017) (No. 16-1137) (internal
citations omitted).
67. Opposition Brief of Respondent, 616 Croft Ave., LLC v. City of West Hollywood,
138 S. Ct. 377 (2017) (No. 16-1137). Thus far, this is an issue the U.S. Supreme Court has avoided
deciding outright, having repeatedly denied petitions for certiorari on this legislative exactions issue. See
Timothy M. Mulvaney, Legislative Exactions and Progressive Property, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 137, 145
(2016) (“The Supreme Court has provided very limited doctrinal guidance on the issue to date, having
denied at least fourteen petitions for certiorari raising this legislative-administration question in the
exactions-takings context.”).
68. 61 Cal. 4th 435 (2015), cert denied, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016) (No. 15-330).
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percent of their income on housing, forcing many to “live in overcrowded or
substandard conditions, while others must find housing far from their jobs,
increasing traffic congestion and environmental impacts.”69
Before the ordinance could go into effect, the California Building Industry
Association (CBIA) sued and won at trial, with the court’s decision justified in part
on takings grounds. The City of San Jose appealed and won at the California
Appellate and California Supreme Court levels. CBIA then filed a petition for
certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. The petition made a variety of legal
arguments, including that the Court should clarify that the standards set forth in the
U.S. Supreme Court’s Nollan and Dolan decisions apply to legislatively-mandated
exactions. The petition went further, however, also framing the argument in terms
of the fundamental nature of property rights: “Owners have a right to their money,
including their investment in their property. Owners also have a well-recognized
right to sell their property to whom they choose, at a price they choose.”70
As with 616 Croft Ave., LLC, a number of amicus briefs were filed in support
of the petition by some of the same groups making the same sorts of arguments
about the fundamental nature of property rights. The Center for Constitutional
Jurisprudence’s brief stated:
California has a long-standing antipathy toward the notion of individual
rights in private property. . . . This case demonstrates that California
continues to be an “outlier” on the issue of individual rights in property.
The state’s approach that necessary government permits constitute the
grant of “advantage” for which the state can demand a portion of property
stands in stark contrast to the notion of liberty enshrined in the United
States Constitution. . . .
One of the core principles of the American Founding is that individual
rights are not granted by majorities or governments, but are inalienable.
The Fifth Amendment seeks to capture a part of this principle in its
announcement that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use,
without just compensation.” The importance of the individual right in
property that is protected in this clause is evident in the writings on which
the Founders based the notion of liberty that is enshrined in the
Constitution.
Of course, the importance of individual rights in property predated the
Declaration of Independence and the American Constitution. Blackstone
noted that property is an “absolute right, inherent in every
Englishman . . . which consists of the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of
all his acquisitions, without any control or dominion, save only by the laws
of the land.” From the pronouncement that “a man’s house is his castle”

69. Opening Brief of Intervenors-Appellants at 2, Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose,
157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813 (2012).
70. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 61 Cal. 4th 435 (2015), petition for cert. filed, 2015
WL 5451038 at *15 (U.S. Sept. 14, 2015) (No. 15-330).
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to William Pitts’ argument that the “poorest man” in the meanest hovel
can deny entry to the King, the common law recognized the individual
right in the ownership and use of private property. Blackstone captures the
essence of this right when he notes that the right of property is the “sole
and despotic dominion . . . over external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right of any other person in the universe.” The individual
rights in private property are part of the common law heritage that our
founders brought with them to America. . . .
This Court has so often characterized the individual rights in property as
“fundamental” that it is difficult to catalogue each instance. The Court has
noted that these rights are among the “sacred rights” secured against
“oppressive legislation.” These rights are the “essence of constitutional
liberty.” In a word, they are “fundamental.”71
The Mountain States Legal Foundation submitted an amicus brief that struck
similar themes:
The sanctity of property in America can be traced to the Magna
Carta. . . . Importantly, early American colonists believed the right to
property, guaranteed in the Magna Carta, to be part of their birthright as
English subjects. . . . Because private property existed before government,
any legitimate government is based on a compact whereby people gave
their allegiance to the government in exchange for the protection of their
property. . . . Thus, the principal function of government is to ensure the
sanctity of private property.72
The broad themes conveyed in support of the developer in CBIA echo those
in 616 Croft Ave., LLC: property rights predate the state; the role of the state is to
protect those rights; those rights include the right to use and dispose of the property
as the owner sees fit and to fix the price at which housing will be sold or rented.
Again, no amicus briefs were submitted on behalf of the city to the
U.S. Supreme Court. At the lower appellate levels, a number of briefs had been
submitted in support of the city’s case. In all instances, as with the city’s briefing at
the U.S. Supreme Court level, no similarly robust conception of private property
rights was put forth. Rather, the briefs relied primarily on data regarding the severity
of housing challenges in the Silicon Valley area and technical precedential arguments
about the inapplicability of Nollan and Dolan to the facts at hand. As in 616 Croft
Ave., LLC, the court denied certiorari in CBIA, leaving these issues ripe to return
to the Supreme Court in the future.

71. Brief for the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 3–9, Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016) (No. 15-330) (internal
citations omitted).
72. Brief for the Mountain States Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
7–11, Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016) (No. 15-330).
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3. A Progressive Property Theory Response
The arguments in support of the petitioners in these cases are in harmony with
the sort of strong private property rights regime that a Demsetzian-type of
argument, outlined above in Section I.A. above, would encourage. Perhaps even
more directly fitting, they draw upon a theoretical conception of property rights
that is at once old and new again. The Blackstonian model of property as “that sole
and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things
of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe,”73
is an ideal which—despite being more than two centuries old—continues to hold
purchase in commonly-held notions of property rights. Modern property law
scholarship has seen a resurgence in a related, if more nuanced, line of thought.
“Exclusionists” argue that the core feature of property is the right to exclude.74
Modern property law already significantly deviates from the overly-simplistic
Blackstonian approach in a variety of areas: in broad doctrinal fields like nuisance,
zoning, servitudes, and takings; in specific topics like public accommodation laws,75
the time-limited monopoly afforded to intellectual property owners, and rules
disfavoring future restraints on alienation; as well as in individual one-off cases76
that limit property rights in the face of broader public policies.77

73. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *2
(Univ. Chi. Press, 1st ed. 1979) (1765–1769). Thanks to Christopher Essert for noting that while this is
the proposition often associated with Blackstone, his views on the subject were significantly more
nuanced.
74. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 14, at 968 (discussing the “presumption in favor of property’s core
right to exclude,” with exceptions at the periphery); see infra Section III.A. for further discussion.
75. See Joseph William Singer, We Don’t Serve Your Kind Here: Public Accommodations and the
Mark of Sodom, 95 B.U. L. REV. 929, 933 (2015) (“In effect, this line in the sand distinguishes the private
home (where one can exclude people from one’s dinner party because of their race) from places of
employment and, one assumes, places of public accommodation (where one cannot indulge in such
discrimination). This means that the vision of property as under the control of the ‘owner’ and subject
to the owner’s ‘sole and despotic dominion,’ as William Blackstone put it, cannot be the model for all
property.”).
76. See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372, 373 (N.J. 1971) (holding no trespass where legal
services attorney and health services worker entered property without permission to provide services
to migrant farmworkers: “Property rights serve human values. They are recognized to that end, and are
limited by it. Title to real property cannot include dominion over the destiny of persons the owner
permits to come upon the premises. Their well-being must remain the paramount concern of a system
of law. Indeed, the needs of the occupants may be so imperative and their strength so weak, that the
law will deny the occupants the power to contract away what is deemed essential to their health, welfare,
or dignity. Here we are concerned with a highly disadvantaged segment of our society. . . . A man’s
right in his real property of course is not absolute. It was a maxim of the common law that one should
so use his property as not to injure the rights of others. Although hardly a precise solvent of actual
controversies, the maxim does express the inevitable proposition that rights are relative and there must
be an accommodation when they meet.”).
77. For additional examples of law’s deviation from the basic Blackstonian model, see
Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 18, at 140. Commentators also have noted that far from being a
passive protector of pre-existing property rights, the state has played an active role in creating and
preserving property throughout the history of the United States, for example, in practices such as
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What sort of alternative theoretical conception of property not only explains
these deviations but also could have responded to the theoretical model set forth in
support of the developers in these inclusionary zoning cases? Progressive property
theory provides one compelling option.78 The authors of the Statement and others
have already considered progressive property theory in a variety of contexts.79 A
progressive property-style analysis similarly could be applied in housing justice
campaigns, such as to the question of whether or not an inclusionary zoning
ordinance impermissibly infringes on the property rights of the petitioners.80
The point of departure would be to dispute the notion that property rights
exist prior to any consideration of the community in which they arise. As Alexander
states:
Property rights and their correlative obligations are cognizable as social
goods, worthy of vindication by the state, only insofar as they are
consistent with community and human flourishing more generally. In the
interest of human flourishing, the community, or more colloquially, the
state, affords legal recognition to asserted claims to resources. Accordingly,
the state does not take away when it abstains from legally vindicating asserted
claims to resources that are inconsistent with human flourishing or with
community itself. In such cases, the community does not merely give.81
In other words, to the extent certain rights would conflict with important
underlying values, it is not the case that the state takes those rights away from
property owners; rather, perhaps they were never given in the first place.
Alternatively, property rights allocations are dynamic and may evolve over time as
necessary to remain accountable to the values they serve.
Under such a formulation, whether an inclusionary zoning ordinance works a
taking of an apartment owner’s property hinges on how we define property rights,
which itself requires an analysis of the competing values at stake. What are those
values in this instance? Considering the specific values identified by the authors of
the Statement, certainly inclusionary zoning ordinances of the type at issue in 616

redlining and the enforcement of exclusionary zoning regimes. See, e.g., RACE, REAL ESTATE, AND
UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 50; THE COLOR OF LAW, supra note 50.
78. Of course, progressive property theory is not the only option. The “human right” or
“constitutional right” to housing frame is another that has recently seen renewed interest. See, e.g., Lisa
T. Alexander, Occupying the Constitutional Right to Housing, 94 NEB. L. REV. 245 (2015).
79. See, e.g., John A. Lovett, Progressive Property in Action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003,
89 NEB. L. REV. 739 (2011); Christopher K. Odinet, Of Progressive Property and Public Debt, 51 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1101 (2016); Jessica A. Shoemaker, Complexity’s Shadow: American Indian Property,
Sovereignty, and the Future, 115 MICH. L. REV. 487, (2017).
80. For additional discussion of progressive property as it relates to housing, see GREGORY
S. ALEXANDER, PROPERTY AND HUMAN FLOURISHING 295–320 (2018) (discussing certain systemic
housing problems and considering various policy solutions). See also Zachary Bray, The New Progressive
Property and the Low-Income Housing Conflict, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1109 (2012) (arguing that the federal
Section 8 program is a better example of the progressive property approach to addressing housing
issues than rent control). For a discussion of Bray’s argument, see infra note 94.
81. Alexander, supra note 5, at 749 (emphasis added).
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Croft Ave., LLC and CBIA implicate the ability of low-income residents to obtain
the “basic survival resource” of housing, as well as the protection of “physical
security.” Decently stable housing has been shown to have significant implications
for the “education of the young” and presumably is a significant factor in the
“capability of sociality.”82 On the other hand, imposition of an inclusionary zoning
ordinance arguably also involves some loss by property owners of “freedom to live
one’s life on one’s own terms.”
Progressive property theorists do not argue that an interrogation of these
various values will lead to a single correct answer regarding whether or not an
inclusionary zoning ordinance impermissibly infringes on the rights of property
owners. And, of course, vigorous debate could be had with respect to competing
visions of the relevant values in any given dispute. But the theory does provide a
systematic theoretical response to the developer arguments in these cases: property
rights do not exist in the abstract, severed from the communities in which they arise;
the role of the state is a complex one, not only to protect absolute rights of owners
to use and dispose but also to consider other important values at stake; and where
a given property law regime leaves a sizeable swath of the community without basic
survival means, such as decent shelter, perhaps certain policies, like inclusionary
zoning, can help a property law system better achieve important normative ends.
Some of this may be implicit in the data-driven arguments made by the cities
in these cases. Clearly, noting the high levels of rent burdens in the San Francisco
Bay area contains an implied statement: this is a bad (or wrong) thing. But unlike
the developers, the cities provide no explicit theoretical grounding for why this is
or should be unacceptable in the eyes of the law. The data are left to stand alone.
As such, the developers claim the entire theoretical space, offering an unchallenged
rendering of property law and property rights and, unlike the cities, explaining why
the given policy is offensive to such a rendering.
Similarly, some of what progressive property theory has to offer may be
implicit in the technical precedential arguments made by the cities. After all, what is
takings analysis—Penn Central’s balancing test, Nollan’s nexus, Dolan’s rough
proportionately, and so on—if not an attempt to balance the liberty rights of
property owners with other important underlying values served by property law.
Yet, again, progressive property theory provides a systematic theoretical frame in
which to understand the normative ends served by this doctrine.
What progressive property theory could add in these cases is not superior to
data-driven or technical precedential arguments. Rather, it is complementary; an
additional dimension that would help buttress the sorts of cases that cities like West
Hollywood and San Jose are already making. Grounding their arguments in
progressive property theory would push back directly against the deeply resonant,

82.

See Housing and Child Health, supra note 49.
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yet fundamentally inadequate, conceptions of property rights that were proffered in
support of the developers in these cases.
B. Rent Control—Property Theory in the Context of a Political Initiative
Inclusionary zoning is but one of many housing justice campaigns that have
been waged in recent years. While other campaigns, or at least their modern
incarnations, have yet to be appealed to the high court, echoes can be heard of the
same sorts of arguments related to the fundamental nature of property rights, as
seen in the briefing for 616 Croft Ave., LLC and CBIA. Rent control provides an
apt example.
Rent control, for decades a relatively dormant area of law, is seeing new life in
various campaigns. Such laws have long been held up as the prototypical wellintentioned policies that hurt those they are intended to help. Rent control, or rent
stabilization, typically refers to government limits on the rents that apartment
owners can charge tenants.83 The traditional argument against rent control is that
capping rents will only lead to disinvestment, abandonment, or conversion to a
different land use; loss of housing supply; and ultimately, an increase in prices as
supply contracts.84 Such arguments often ignore more sophisticated rent control
proposals, that would, for example, couple rent limits with annual consumer price
index (CPI) increases, the ability to recoup rehabilitation expenditures, allowance
for a limited dividend to owners, eviction protections, strong implied warranty of
habitability rights, vacancy decontrol, limitations on conversions, and exemptions
for new construction.85
1. The Prop. 10 Initiative in California
For purposes of this Article, however, as stated previously, I am less
concerned with efficacy arguments and more concerned with arguments about the
appropriateness of rent control regimes in the face of competing conceptions about
the fundamental nature of property rights. The history of rent control in California
is instructive in this regard. Rent control saw its heyday in the 1970s, when many
jurisdictions passed rent control ordinances, some of which survive today.86 In

83. While there is no perfect uniformity of definition, rent stabilization typically refers to laws
that limit rent increases during the term of a single tenancy, but allow the landlord to reset rents to
market levels between tenancies.
84. See, e.g., EDWARD L. GLAESER & JOSEPH GYOURKO, RETHINKING FEDERAL HOUSING
POLICY: HOW TO MAKE HOUSING PLENTIFUL AND AFFORDABLE 60 (2008) (“If rent control lowers
rents, it will also ensure less building of rental properties and more conversions of the rental stock to
owner-occupied condominiums . . . . A second negative effect of rent control is that it limits landlords’
incentive to invest in building quality.”).
85. See Note, Reassessing Rent Control: Its Economic Impact in a Gentrifying Housing Market, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1835 (1988) (proposal suggested by Duncan Kennedy and Karl Case).
86. See Saul Gonzalez, What You Need to Know About Rent Control, KCRW (May 4, 2018),
https://www.kqed.org/news/11666426/what-you-need-to-know-about-rent-control [ https://
perma.cc/8LW5-VR9P ] (“There are more than 450 municipalities in California, but only 15 of them
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1995, however, the state legislature passed the Costa Hawkins Rental Housing Act,
which had at least two significant effects: (1) it prohibited the application of rent
control to all new construction and (2) it provided for vacancy decontrol, a
mechanism that allows owners to raise rents to fair market levels upon the transition
from one tenancy to the next.87
Costa Hawkins led to decades of relative dormancy in the area of rent control
in the state. However, 2018 saw the rise of a vigorous housing justice campaign to
repeal Costa Hawkins. Opponents of the measure, including the California
Apartment Association, dedicated nearly $75 million to defeat the initiative. In the
official voter guide, the first argument against Proposition 10 stated, “Prop. 10
could hurt homeowners by authorizing a new government bureaucracy that can tell
homeowners what they can and cannot do with their own private residence.”88 The
competing argument in support of the proposition contained no similar conception
of property rights but rather stated, “The rent is too damn high!”89
Similarly, in the media, both sides made arguments related to the likely effects
of Prop 10. Opponents talked about the increased housing costs for veterans, effect
on home values for retirees, and likelihood that housing will become less available
and less affordable.90 Opponents, however, grounded their opposition in a broader
theoretical frame, based on the notion that it would infringe on fundamental private
property rights: “Prop 10 is an attack on homeowners. Prop 10 eliminates
protections for homeowners and allows regulators to tell homeowners how much
they can charge to rent out even one room in their home. . . . Prop 10 will take away
homeowners’ rights: Prop 10 eliminates protections for homeowners and allows
regulators to tell single-family homeowners how much they can charge to rent out
a single room in their homes.”91
By contrast, proponents’ arguments tended to highlight data-driven and
pragmatic concerns:
Home prices and rents are higher in California than any other state except
Hawaii. Rent hikes in the state are double the national average—even
worse in Los Angeles, where apartments cost 100 percent more than the
national average. Out of control housing costs, driven by corporate
landlords and big real estate, have left many Californians living paycheck

have rent control laws on the books. They include most of the state’s costlier cities, like Los Angeles,
San Francisco, Berkeley, West Hollywood and Santa Monica.”).
87. Stats. 1995, Ch. 331, Sec. 1. (effective January 1, 1996) (incorporated as amended,
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1954.50–54.535 (West 2018)). The law also exempted single-family homes and
condominiums.
88. OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION
N OVEMBER 6, 2018, C ALIFORNIA S ECRETARY OF S TATE , http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/
propositions/10/arguments-rebuttals.htm. [ https://perma.cc/E6UK-EN45 ]
89. Id.
90. See NO ON PROP 10, Noprop10.org/the-facts/homeowners [ https://perma.cc/X9WHJXFB ] ( last visited Sept. 21, 2019 ).
91. Id.
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to paycheck, with the American dream of buying a home no longer within
reach. Nearly 70 percent of households don’t make enough to afford an
average priced home, which runs $538,640.92
Prop 10 ultimately would be defeated by an approximately 60–40 margin.93
2. A Progressive Property Theory Response
How could advocates or, when such matters reach the courtroom, litigants
respond to the exclusionist rhetoric of the sort that helped defeat Prop 10? The
notion that “the government can’t tell you what to do with your property” resonates
strongly. What competing theoretical frame could challenge this model? Again,
progressive property theory could provide an answer. It reframes the question from,
“Does an absolute right to set prices at any level exist?” to questions such as, “What are
the underlying, and potentially competing, multivariate values at stake?”; “In addition to the
rights of landlords, what obligations do they owe members of their community?”; and “What
sort of community life is enabled by supporting or rejecting a rent control regime?”94

92. YES ON 10, voteyesonprop10.org/read-our-initiative/ [ https://web.archive.org/web/2018
1221000129/voteyesonprop10.org/read-our-initiative/ ] ( last visited Dec. 21, 2018 ) [on file with
author].
93. Liam Dillon, Voters Reject Proposition 10, Halting Effort to Expand Rent Control Across the
State, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-proposition-10-rentcontrol-20181106-story.html [ https://perma.cc/2RDD-5L5N ] (noting a fifty-nine percent to fortyone percent final tally).
94. Zachary Bray argues that the federal Section 8 program, via which eligible low-income
households receive rental payment assistance from the government, “fits the values and ends of the
new progressive progressive-property approach better than rent control . . . .” Bray, supra note 80, at
1109. In considering critiques of progressive property theory that it “cohere[s] as little more than a grab
bag of largely unrelated values lacking practical consistency,” he argues that progressive property should
be able to “provide relatively consistent and predictable answers” for choosing between alternative legal
regimes that seek to serve the communitarian values of progressive property. Id. at 1114–15. To achieve
this, Bray reintroduces what he describes as basic insights of law and economics to help answer such
questions as, Is rent control or Section 8 a better approach to low-income housing? Law and economics
instructs that landlords will attempt to maximize profit, a notion he uses to argue that rent control will
lead to disinvestment in properties and under-the-table exploitation of tenants in ways that Section 8
assistance does not. Id. at 1124, 1154–55. He concludes that since Section 8 is both more efficient than
rent control, and better serves the equitable and communitarian values of progressive property theory,
a progressive property analysis would favor Section 8 over rent control. Id. at 1160–61.
Bray’s well-articulated concern with the indeterminacy of progressive property theory, and his attempt
to coordinate it with a law and economics approach, is consistent with other critiques of progressive
property theory that I describe further in Section III.A. Here, addressing solely his conclusions about
the relative merits of Section 8 and rent control: 1) he may well be right that Section 8 better serves the
equitable and communitarian values of progressive property theory. Unfortunately, as noted above,
federal rental assistance is not an entitlement in the U.S. and so programs like Section 8 are available
only to approximately a quarter of all eligible households. See Bray, supra note 80; see also JOINT
CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 30 (2014).
As such, Bray’s argument would not dispute that the values and ends of progressive property theory
might be served by a rent control campaign in a reality where Section 8 assistance is not universally
available; 2) it may not be the case that Section 8 better serves the equitable and communitarian values
of progressive property theory than all potential rent control regimes. Bray argues against a traditional
version of rent control, as compared to, for example, the sophisticated model offered by Duncan
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A progressive property analysis of the sort embraced by the authors of the
Statement may also consider the liberty of the housing owner as one value worthy of
consideration.95 Clearly a rent control ordinance results in some limits on this
liberty—e.g., the liberty to set the initial rental price for all units or, depending on
the type of rent control ordinance at issue, the liberty to evict without good cause.
This value would not necessarily be cast aside.
At the same time, a progressive property analysis would place the loss of
liberty in context with other values at stake—for example, the physical security of
potential low-income residents and their ability to obtain basic survival resources
necessary to participate in the social and political life of the community. Progressive
property theory thus provides a theoretical frame in which to respond to arguments
such as those made by landlords in the Prop 10 campaign. Whether or not rent
control infringes on basic property rights is not as simple as looking to whether it
imposes limits on the “right to set prices” or the “right to exclude” liberty value of
landlords. Rather, it requires a thorough evaluation of the underlying values at stake,
which include a broader set than those suggested by anti-Prop 10 landlords.
That is a lot to put on a campaign poster. It is relatively easy to imagine what
the reply briefs in 616 Croft Ave., LLC and CBIA might have looked like had cities
incorporated progressive property theory. It is less straightforward to translate the
language of the theory into the parlance of the political initiative.96 And perhaps its
competing values approach is implicit in data on unwieldy rent burdens and
statements like, “The rent is too damn high!”97

Kennedy that would mitigate some of Bray’s concerns about the “anti-progressive effects” of rent
control; see Note, supra note 85 and accompanying text; 3) there are also “anti-progressive effects” of
Section 8—for example, the fact that, unlike with rent control, Section 8 voucher holders often suffer
severe discrimination in attempting to utilize vouchers on the private market. See PRRAC, SECTION 8
DISCRIMINATION, supra note 8. Law and economics, like progressive property theory, classically suffers
from similar problems of indeterminacy in the choice of which variables it attends to and the relative
weights it assigns to them; and 4) Section 8 is a tax and transfer program and the notion that progressive
property theory would support it on efficiency grounds over market-distortive regimes like rent control
bears close resemblance to the very sorts of arguments that progressive property theory sought to
address at the outset. All this notwithstanding, Alexander agrees with Bray’s conclusion. ALEXANDER,
supra note 80, at 316 (“Bray correctly observes that Section 8 better fits ‘the values and ends of the new
progressive-property approach . . . than rent control.’”).
95. Though query whether this sort of liberty implicates core flourishing-related concerns. And,
of course, housing security also implicates liberty considerations of tenants.
96. Discussions of prior drafts of this Article have yielded suggestions for a variety of banners
that might fly over a progressive property-infused campaign, including “This Is My Home” and ideas
drawing on the “Open Housing” movement of the 1960s. My primary purpose here is not to wordsmith
political slogans, nor is it to suggest how grassroots advocates should choose their words in speaking
about matters as personal as the home. It is only to suggest that there may be value in framing the issue
in terms that demonstrate coherence with deeply-rooted property theory, rather than allowing
opponents to claim the theoretical space, with the attendant legal and moral force of argument. Also,
effective messaging to courts, as in the inclusionary zoning examples, likely would look much different
than effective popular campaign messaging.
97. Indeed, housing justice campaigns like Prop 10 are already rife with sentiments that could
be interpreted as highly consistent with more formalized notions of progressive property theory. The
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But, again, there is value in making explicit the implicit. Why—from the
perspective of the law—does it matter that the rent is high? The Blackstonian model
of property ownership is comfortable with the rent being high. This model has
persisted for hundreds of years and continues to hold sway in commonly-held views
of property rights. If it is to be replaced, compelling alternative models must be
made accessible.98
When such campaigns, like the ones discussed in this Section, encounter
challenges related to the fundamental nature of property rights, advocates should
consider offering a competing model. This would not be in place of important datadriven and pragmatic arguments speaking to the severity of housing challenges in a
region. Rather, this approach would take those arguments a step further and explain
why such dire outcomes are relevant in the eyes of the law to an assessment of
property rights. By drawing on progressive property theory, such campaigns would
provide an explicit alternative to those antiquated models of property and
ownership that are still in widespread circulation.
C. The Spectrum of Housing Justice Campaigns
Inclusionary zoning and rent control are but two types of modern housing
justice campaigns. In addition, cities and states across the country have been passing
laws that prohibit discrimination against Section 8 voucher holders.99 Legal disputes
to define the contours of the implied warranty of habitability have been ongoing.100
Local rental housing inspection programs to proactively address substandard
conditions have also seen new support.101 And there is a perennial debate at the
federal level over the need for an expansion of federal rental assistance.102
Each of these initiatives in some way limits the liberty of landlords—yet, not
all to the same extent. Take, for example, liberty with respect to the right to exclude
people from one’s own housing. Housing justice campaigns could be thought of as
existing along a spectrum of least to greatest impact with respect to this value. At
one end of the spectrum, simply providing additional federal assistance, either via
increased taxation or reallocation of priorities, does little to intrude upon this liberty

conversation here between theory and practice would best be a bilateral one, in which such campaigns
are not only enriched through more systematic grounding in theory, but in which progressive property
theory too could be refined through the experience of application to a particular context.
98. This is not to argue that the availability of alternative conceptions of property alone would
have been sufficient to prevail over the well-financed anti-Prop 10 landlord lobby. I suggest simply
that the availability of alternative conceptions is necessary to confront antiquated ideas of the
homeowner’s absolute property rights—ideas that proved central to the successful anti-Prop 10
campaign.
99.
See PRRAC, SECTION 8 DISCRIMINATION, supra note 8.
100. Kohner Properties, Inc. v. Latasha Johnson, 553 S.W.3d 280 (Mo. 2018) (tenant challenge
to rules requiring tender of rent to the court as a prerequisite to raising a breach of the implied warranty
of habitability as a defense or counterclaim in a suit for rent and possession).
101. See Turque, supra note 9.
102. See RICE, supra note 10.
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value. Local inspection programs, permitting entry by government inspectors to
detect incidents where a landlord is falling below required standards, involve a
somewhat more significant curtailing of this liberty value. Rent control, often
coupled with good cause eviction protections, moves further in the direction of
curtailing the right to exclude. The same goes for robust enforcement of the implied
warranty of habitability, often preventing a landlord from evicting a tenant
withholding rent. At the far end of the spectrum, not being able to deny occupancy
to a Section 8 voucher holder perhaps most directly offends a strong right to
exclude by forcing owners to permit occupancy by households they otherwise
would deny.
Laying these various efforts along a spectrum from least to greatest impact on
the liberty value of the right to exclude might look something like this:

In each case, a progressive property analysis would have to contend with
the impact of these housing initiatives on the liberty value of the property owner.
And yet, as with inclusionary zoning or rent control, the basic structure of the
argument would be the same: placing in context the limits on a landlord’s freedom
with other important values at stake.
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III. WHAT MAKES A LEGAL THEORY INFLUENTIAL: THE SITUATIONAL
ADVANTAGE OF LAW & ECONOMICS
Despite the significant potential of progressive property theory to have the
sort of impact described above, ten years after the publication of the Statement, the
theory is yet to have any demonstrable impact outside of legal academia.103 Westlaw
searches for “Progressive Property,” “Progressive Property Theory,” or for
citations to the Statement, find zero federal or state cases citing to the theory.104 This
is in stark contrast to the hundreds of cases citing to, and infused with, law and
economics theory. Alexander’s excellent supplementary article, The Social-Obligation
Norm in American Property, has been cited by one court, the United States District
Court of New Mexico, for the proposition that the right to exclude is the core
feature of property rights in the minds of most people—not exactly the primary
proposition the article intended to support.105 A question thus arises: what accounts
for this limited impact?106
A. Hypothesis 1: Endogenous Factors
A number of commentators have critiqued progressive property theory on the
basis of its own terms. I will refer to such critiques as endogenous factors—i.e.,
reasons that relate to the content of the theory itself.
The Statement was originally published in a symposium alongside a number of
other articles, some expanding on the principles and some challenging various
aspects of the theory. Henry Smith, for example, does not disagree with the ends of
progressive property theory but rather the means. “It is hard to be against human
flourishing . . . .”107 Yet he argues that the sort of multivariate analysis suggested by
the authors of the Statement “ignores the benefits of simple ex ante baselines”108 and
“would undermine property’s advantages of solving problems wholesale and
coordinating the activities of often-anonymous actors.”109 A strong presumptive
right to exclude as a core feature of property reduces to manageable size the
complexity of evaluating every flourishing-related value at stake in every minor
property dispute. Smith argues that this presumption is rebuttable—in cases, for

103. For the purposes of this Article, I am primarily concerned with influence on laws and legal
institutions, rather than, for example, influence on other academic fields.
104. Last searched July 3, 2018.
105. See Arnoldo Carrillo v. Penn Nat’l Gaming Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d 1204 (D.N.M. 2016).
106. Of course, lack of citation to the theory itself does not mean the ideas contained in the
Statement have not exerted influence. One reader of a draft of this Article has suggested that courts
may be hesitant to reference progressive property theory by name, given the modern political valence
of “progressive” as a term. Also, commentators have noted that progressive property theory has
perhaps had a greater influence in jurisdictions outside of the United States, for example, in places such
as South Africa.
107. Smith, supra note 14, at 960.
108. Id. at 968.
109. Id. at 963.
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example, of discrimination or necessity—but those are exceptions that should not
swallow the rule.
Jedediah Purdy argues that progressive property theory’s project of critiquing
law and economics may be redirected to more fruitful ends. He reminds us that law
and economics is itself built upon the moral tradition of utilitarianism. For
philosophers like Bentham:
[T]he moral gravamen of the program was (in significant part) that it
counted the well-being of all alike; those reformers scorned obscurantist
modes of reasoning that they saw as preserving the inequitable privileges
of elites. Utilitarianism, then, was in good part a view about equality, and
as a mode of justification, it relied on the idea that all who participated in
social life were obliged to respect that idea of equality—that is, to embrace
a set of institutions and rules designed on the principle that the welfare (or,
happiness) of each counted alike.110
To Purdy, the philosophical tradition upon which law and economics rests,
and the welfare-maximizing approach it embraces, demands obligations related to
equality that are at least in conversation with those espoused by the authors of the
Statement. Implicit in his analysis is the notion that perhaps law and economics
should not be so quickly cast aside, and rather should be considered as a model that,
depending on the particular scholarly rendering, could help serve similar ends as
progressive property theory.111
Katrina Wyman echoes this notion of not lumping all law and economics
analysis together. She, too, notes the potential for certain breeds of law and
economics to serve goals that may be in harmony with the ends of the
Statement: “. . . it is noteworthy that there are economically oriented scholars who
maintain that economic analysis, when properly applied, justifies a lot more
government regulation than conventionally assumed.”112
Additional scholarship has emerged since the publication of the original
symposium that further critiques and refines the concepts set forth in the original
description of progressive property theory. For example, Ezra Rosser attacks from
“the left flank” in arguing that despite its progressive aims, the theory does not go
far enough.113 He is particularly critical of the extent to which progressive property
theory addresses issues of original acquisition of property and current distributional
inequities, particularly as they relate to race: “Rather than treating acquisition and
distribution as irrelevant or secondary to rules involving use rights, progressive
scholars should embrace and emphasize these issues. Legal and popular
understanding of the racialized nature of acquisition and distribution offers a

110. Purdy, supra note 15, at 955.
111. Zachary Bray similarly considers how law and economics might be used in conjunction
with progressive property theory to serve its equitable and communitarian ends. See Bray, supra note 80,
and discussion of his analysis in the context of rent control, supra note 94.
112. Wyman, supra note 15, at 995–96.
113. See Rosser, supra note 16, at 171.

First to Printer_Weiss (Do Not Delete)

2019]

PROGRESSIVE PROPERTY THEORY

10/29/2019 1:37 PM

279

powerful means of questioning the exclusionary force of ownership.”114 Others, like
Tim Mulvaney, are more optimistic about progressive property theory’s potential
“to serve a role in furthering a progressive society.”115 His prescription is for the
theory to embrace an ethic of transparency, humility, and concern of economic
identity.116
Do these various critiques of progressive property theory explain its failure to
extend its reach beyond the realm of legal academia? Certainly, they raise interesting
questions that could be debated at length. Smith’s pragmatic concerns about
complexity of analysis and the cost-saving effect of default rules are important—
though his explanation for how the analysis necessary to determine when such
presumptions are rebuttable (e.g., in cases of necessity or antidiscrimination laws),
and how the attendant secondary costs of such analysis do not swallow the prior
cost savings, could complicate his critique.117 As noted above, modern property law
is littered with exceptions to a basic right to exclude—progressive property theory
does not create this complexity, but rather provides a framework in which to better
understand it. Nor must the theory be antithetical to default rules that provide
helpful order—using progressive property theory as a method of analysis to uphold
the legality of, or advocate for the passage of, a general land use regulation (like
inclusionary zoning or rent control) has no less of a standardization effect on the
law than using alternative theories to defeat such policies. As Alexander has put it,
“The social-obligation norm does not signify the sacrifice of law-like predictability
in the pursuit of purely ad hoc determinations about what social justice
demands.”118 Law and economics, too, could be deployed to reach outlandish
conclusions or to raise infinitely complex computational problems.119 If this were a
disqualifying metric, both theories would be abandoned. The basic idea is that
progressive property theory provides a helpful orientation from which to approach
property-related questions.

114. Id. at 111.
115. Timothy M. Mulvaney, Progressive Property Moving Forward, 5 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 349, 350
(2012).
116. Id. at 350–51.
117. For a similar point, see Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 18, at 139 (“As exclusion theorists
recognize, in some situations exclusion is so costly that it is worth paying the price of
governance . . . . The problem, from the perspective of exclusion theory, is that too many exceptions
will undermine the informational efficiencies asserted on behalf of the open-ended right to exclude.
But this raises a difficult question for the exclusion theorist. Apart from being able to rule out the
extremes (unlimited exclusion power without exception and universal case-by-case utilitarian
[re]calculation of each and every claimed right of access), how can we know what mode of decision
making to employ in any given situation? How are we to know whether the costs of considering this
particular exception to the core exclusion structure of property outweigh the benefits unless we actually
carry out a full utilitarian calculus.”).
118. Gregory S. Alexander, The Complex Core of Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1063, 1067
(2009).
119. Id. at 1069.
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With respect to the other critiques mentioned above, the notion that law and
economics, rather than a foil, could be in conversation with progressive property
theory and serve some of the same goals certainly seems worthy of additional
consideration. And the refinements offered by Rosser and Mulvaney seem to be
fruitful next steps in the development of the theory. None of this commentary,
however, appears fatal to the overall project—or at least no more defeating than
the sorts of critiques that law and economics itself encounters.
B. Hypothesis 2: Exogenous Factors
I argue that a full explanation of why law and economics has thrived in ways
that progressive property theory has not requires looking beyond the content of the
theories themselves. Of course, law and economics has had much more time to
impact U.S. law and legal institutions. Consideration of other exogenous factors—
or reasons external to the theories themselves—sheds even more light.
Jon Hanson and co-authors have looked at the rise of law and economics in
legal academia and beyond.120 Rather than being a story of law and economics
emerging victorious from the neutral battlefield of ideas,121 he traces the concerted
effort, funded by individuals and foundations, that led to the ascension of law and
economics as a force in legal academia and, more broadly, American law.122
In looking at the impact of one such foundation—the John M. Olin
Foundation—Hanson describes the tens of millions of dollars it has provided to
establish centers at schools like Harvard, Yale, Stanford, the University of Chicago,
Columbia, Georgetown, Duke, the University of Virginia, the University of
Pennsylvania, and the University of Michigan.123 He explains how Olin has
attempted to alter the legal academic playing field:
[Olin money] has a significant influence not only in encouraging certain
types of scholarship, but also in increasing the credibility of that
scholarship. It establishes “centers” dedicated to law and economics
theory, provides funding for journals through which law and economics
scholarship can be stamped with the legitimacy of “peer review” by other
legal economists, finances a series of workshops to encourage efficiencyoriented scholars to share and test their views at elite law schools, and gives
scholarships and fellowships to top law students who participate in law and
economics seminars and produce law and economics scholarship.124

120. See, e.g., Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 17; Adam Benforado, Jon Hanson, David Yosifon,
Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645 (2004) [hereinafter Broken Scales].
121. See Broken Scales, supra note 120, at 1729 (“Thus, by conventional accounts, the triumph
of law and economics, presently the dominant legal-theoretic paradigm, appears to be simply the result
of the best theory winning out in the most objective and meritocratic of arenas—academia. Upon closer
examination, however, the success of law and economics may reflect less its objective superiority and
more its axiomatic commitment to dispositionism and resultant faith in free choice and markets.”).
122. The Situation, supra note 17, at 272–84.
123. Id. at 273–74.
124. Id. at 274.
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Hanson also notes the connection between the Olin Foundation and
individuals with an agenda of altering not just legal academia, but national policy
and society writ large.125 And he traces how ideas generated at Olin Centers are
connected with a network that extends beyond the walls of academia, to think tanks,
industry and public relations firms, and policymakers.126
Needless to say, progressive property theory has been supported by no similar
effort to alter the property law landscape.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE LAW SCHOOL CLINIC IN FURTHERING PROGRESSIVE
PROPERTY THEORY
In order for progressive property theory broadly to influence the institution
of American property law, and to bolster housing justice campaigns in specific, the
theory needs to be the province of more than a select group of legal scholars writing
about it in law journals. Specifically, it needs to connect with vehicles of
mobilization that can infuse the theory into real world legal debates.
I suggest here that the law school clinic is one promising vehicle for furthering
the impact of progressive property theory. Clinics are uniquely situated—with one
foot in the university and one foot in the real world—to serve as a theory delivery
mechanism. Others have argued for the importance of theory-infused clinics. Alina

125. See Broken Scales, supra note 120, at 1730 (“William Simon, one of the forces behind the
John M. Olin Foundation . . . understood early on the need for business interests to actively promote
a . . . worldview that celebrated markets . . . . Simon considered the knowledge being produced and
taught at American universities in the early 1980s, when he first came to head the Olin Foundation, to
be dangerously antithetical to those ends. For Simon, this problem was tantamount to a war of liberty
versus totalitarianism—a war that in his view had to be waged simultaneously on several fronts:
‘(1) Funds generated by business . . . must rush by multimillions to the aid of liberty, in the
many places where it is beleaguered.
....
. . . [Foundations established by such funds must] serve explicitly as intellectual refuges for
the non-egalitarian scholars and writers in our society who today work largely alone in the
face of overwhelming indifference or hostility. They must be given grants, grants, and more
grants in exchange for books, books, and more books . . . .
(2) Businesses must cease in the mindless subsidizing of colleges and universities whose
departments of economics, government, politics, and history are hostile to capitalism and
whose facilities will not hire scholars whose views are otherwise . . . . America’s major
universities are today churning out young collectivists by legions, and it is irrational for
businessmen to support them . . . .’”
126. See Broken Scales, supra note 120, at 1731–33 (“Capturing legal academia, while a valuable
first step, has only been the top layer of a multi-layered process . . . . Probusiness ideas emerging at
Olin Centers around the country have found their way into think tanks with similar goals and funding
sources . . . . [Public relations firm] Berman & Co. reports that it has engendered what it calls an
‘[a]cadmic research network’ to ‘commission more than a dozen major research projects each year to
independent academics at leading research universities,’ including the University of Chicago, University
of Texas, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This work is supported at another level by
‘building and maintaining sophisticated grassroots activation systems;’ ‘drawing industry allies from
associations, think tanks, or the private sector;’ ‘providing data, information, and refined messages that
others use to make their cases—and ours—in the policy arena;’ and the ultimate in credibility creation,
‘develop[ing] strong ties to individuals who are often perceived as ‘anti-industry’ but who agree with
focused messages that we seek to publicize.’”).
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Ball makes a compelling argument from a pedagogical perspective for exposing
students enrolled in business law clinics to critical theory.127 She argues that
incorporating critical legal theory into the process of client selection can deepen
student learning by contextualizing client matters, encouraging creative lawyering,
promoting higher order thinking, and developing professional character.128
“Incorporating critical legal theory disrupts conventional legal education by
exposing the students to literature that challenges not only existing distributions of
power, but also envisions how the legal system could facilitate equity.”129
Introducing legal theory into the law school clinic can do more than achieve
pedagogical goals. It can also help influence the campaigns in which clinics are
engaged. How do beliefs like Blackstone’s and the property-related outcomes that
they influence come to be changed? Through the filing of U.S. Supreme Court
briefs in cases like 616 Croft Ave., LLC and CBIA that push back against antiquated
ideals? Through more local grassroots organizing efforts around political initiatives
like Prop. 10? Important recent research has looked at the role of social movements
and movement lawyering in helping to change “structural conditions of inequality”
and “social attitudes and cultural norms.”130 The longstanding debate that emerged
from the era of legal liberalism and the litigation of cases like Brown v. Board of
Education and Roe v. Wade, over the efficacy of law and lawyers to help effect
change, is being looked at with fresh eyes.131
And what is emerging is a new paradigm of movement lawyering that includes,
what Scott Cummings has referred to as, integrated advocacy.132 In such efforts,
“lawyers combine modes of advocacy—litigation, policy reform, transactional
work, organizing support, media relations, and community education—in order to
maximize political pressure and transform public opinion.”133 The directionality of
influence between litigation and broader grassroots campaigns runs both ways.
What this research indicates is that, if done right, whether it be through the filing
of court briefs or through more popular widespread initiatives, lawyers as partners
engaged in housing justice campaigns hold the potential to help change attitudes
and norms and to combat structures of inequality.
Law school clinics are well-positioned to, and already are, engaging in such
multifaceted efforts—Cummings highlights a number of such clinical efforts

127. See, e.g., Alina S. Ball, Disruptive Pedagogy: Incorporating Critical Theory in Business Law
Clinics, 22 CLINICAL L. REV. 1 (2015).
128. Id. at 29.
129. Id. at 35.
130. See Scott L. Cummings, Movement Lawyering, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1645, 1653 (2017).
131. See Scott L. Cummings, Rethinking the Foundational Critiques of Lawyers in Social
Movements, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987 (2017).
132. Cummings, supra note 130, at 1695.
133. Id. at 1696. Under this model, lawyers do not do this work alone. See id. at 1697 (“Crossdisciplinary collaboration between lawyers and nonlawyers is a foundation of integrated advocacy. In
this approach, lawyers build relations with nonlegal organizations to amplify their legal claims, connect
to organizing campaigns, promote monitoring and compliance over time, and shift public opinion.”).
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already underway.134 With respect to progressive property theory in particular,
community economic development clinics, housing law clinics, and a variety of
related advocacy and transactional clinics, often work on issues that have at their
center fundamental questions of property rights. The distributional questions at the
core of progressive property theory are regularly of central concern to clinicians and
their clients. Law school clinics thus are well positioned to draw upon progressive
property theory to support their arguments about what property rights the courts
should vindicate, and what property rights would conflict with important underlying
values, such as “the ability of each person to obtain the material resources necessary
for full social and political participation.”135
Consider, as an example, a community economic development clinic (the
CED Clinic) that represents a nonprofit community development corporation (the
CDC) developer of affordable housing. Suppose the CDC wants to develop
government-subsidized housing in a certain affluent neighborhood but faces severe
NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) resistance from local neighbors. The CED Clinic
may find itself representing the CDC before a local planning and zoning
commission (in a proceeding that may end up in litigation) and working with
tenants, organizers, other local nonprofits, and government officials in a campaign
to garner additional local support to bring the project to fruition. It would not be
uncommon for property-rights related questions to arise: neighbors argue that the
proposed complex will be a nuisance, dramatically diminishing property values in
the area; opponents question the CDC’s entitlement to build the project under state
and local land use laws. The general resistance to the project is captured by a
sentiment that the proposed subsidized housing is just the government artificially
meddling in the private housing market.136

134. Id. at 1702–03 (“Law school clinics have been important organizational partners in
movement campaigns. . . . These collaborations illuminate how law school clinical programs—with
access to resources, control over case dockets, and incentives to participate in and thereby expose
students to innovative advocacy—can serve as important organizational partners in social movement
campaigns: playing the role of movement counsel as they train the next generation of movement
lawyers.”).
135. A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 1, at 744.
136. Note that under one characterization, this example differs from the inclusionary zoning
and rent control examples discussed above, in that in those cases, progressive property theory would
be deployed to argue for imposing certain restrictions on landowners (i.e., price controls). In this case,
progressive property theory would be deployed to argue for allowing a landowner the affirmative right
to use property in the manner it sees fit (i.e., allowing the CDC to develop its own land). Thus, true
“exclusionists” seemingly should side with the CDC in this case. Of course, restrictions on Party A can
be alternatively characterized as affirmative rights to Party B, and vice versa: the obligation of a price
restriction on Party A being an affirmative right for Party B to rent at no more than a certain price; an
affirmative right for Party B to build being a restriction on neighbors’ rights to enjoy their property
free of, in their view, an adjacent nuisance. In all of these cases, the property law system is assigning
property entitlements, and my argument is simply that progressive property theory could be deployed
by housing advocates in efforts to influence such assignments.
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In each instance, clinical instructors,137 working with law students, and in
conjunction with local partners and/or coalitions, could respond, not only with
data, refuting the proffered impact on property values; not only with technical
argument about the applicability of various land use laws; but also applying a
progressive property frame that raises the broader sorts of questions discussed
herein, such as: What obligations exist to ensure that low-income residents have access to
the basic survival resource of housing? What type of communal life is enabled by allowing
communities to wall themselves off and become enclaves for the wealthy? The clinic could
deploy progressive property theory to frame the argument in a manner that
demonstrates how, rather than being an assault on neighboring property rights,
permitting the subsidized housing project to move forward is in harmony with what
might be required of a just property law system.
Can law school clinics do for progressive property theory what organizations
like the Olin Foundation have done for law and economics? Certainly not on their
own. But the law school clinic could be a starting point for mobilizing the theory
and moving it beyond the walls of legal academia and out into battlefields, like those
upon which housing justice campaigns are being fought, where it could do some
real good.
CONCLUSION
Progressive property theory marks a pivot in our theoretical understanding of
the nature of property. It offers a framework that steps back from preference
aggregating, dethrones the “right to exclude” from its preeminence, and instead asks
more broadly, What are the values served by our property rules and institutions? Among
them, it places key emphasis on human flourishing—an admittedly broad concept,
but one that theorists use as a rough stand-in for the notion that everyone in a
community should have an opportunity to thrive. Given that we develop in a
communal context, the theory places a refreshing emphasis on the obligations of
ownership—that property law should promote, for example, the ability of all people
to obtain basic survival resources. Of course, property serves other values, such as
liberty, which must be considered as well. The resulting analysis may not lead to a
single determinate outcome and raises questions of complexity—but no more so
than in a true attempt to tally aggregate welfare across a society or, necessarily, to
determine when to override basic default rules. What progressive property theory
does offer is a helpful theoretical reorientation.
Housing advocates concerned with ensuring that all people have access to
decent housing opportunities engage in daily struggles that implicate the nature of
property. Data about massive disparities are critical to making a case for change.

137. One commentator has questioned the feasibility of asking clinicians to shoulder the burden
of teaching legal theory in addition to all of their other responsibilities. Perhaps this is an area where
the trend toward greater collaboration between “doctrinal” and clinical faculty could be beneficial in
the teaching of clinical courses or offering any number of other experiential opportunities.
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Technical legal arguments built on precedent can be extremely effective. A
complementary tool would be providing a more robust theoretical framework
through which judges, and society at large, could better understand that the legal
interventions pushed by advocates are not deviations from appropriate property
laws, but rather are highly consonant with what is required of a just legal system.
The purpose of this Article has been to point out that there is room for
bilateral support here. Progressive property theory, which thus far has remained
close to home in legal academia, could provide just the sort of theoretical grounding
that would be of help to housing justice campaigns. These campaigns, in turn, with
partners that include law school clinics, could help move progressive property
theory beyond academia, out into courtrooms and political discourse, and,
ultimately, mobilize the theory to impact the legal rules and institutions that it set
its sights on in its earliest statement.
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